Evaluating Policy Rules Under Imperfect Credibility /
Evaluation of policy rules using empirical macroeconomic models is usually done on the assumption that the rules are perfectly credible. However, there are usually circumstances that cause the authorities to abandon any given rule. The public's expectations reflect this possibility. In the pape...
| Main Author: | Masson, Paul |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Symansky, Steven |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1991.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1991/128 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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