01668cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003151 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451857900 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Jeanne, Olivier. Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap : The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank / Olivier Jeanne, Lars Svensson. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (44 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap. Mode of access: Internet Svensson, Lars. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/162 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/162/001.2004.issue-162-en.xml IMF e-Library