On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs /
This paper argues that both horizontal and intertemporal competition among recipient governments are needed in order to ensure incentives for effective utilization of targeted transfers. This has implications for budgeting frameworks and the types of information needed that might be amenable to form...
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| その他の著者: | |
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/220 |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
| 要約: | This paper argues that both horizontal and intertemporal competition among recipient governments are needed in order to ensure incentives for effective utilization of targeted transfers. This has implications for budgeting frameworks and the types of information needed that might be amenable to formal contracting between the levels of government. |
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| 記述事項: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| 物理的記述: | 1 online resource (14 pages) |
| フォーマット: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| アクセス: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |