01811cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003294 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451861884 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Kletzer, Kenneth. Deposit Insurance Regulatory forbearance and Economic Growth : Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis / Kenneth Kletzer, Robert Dekle. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (34 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation demonstrates how deposit insurance and prudential regulatory forbearance lead to banking crises and growth declines. The model assumptions are based on features of the Japanese financial system and regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s. Mode of access: Internet Dekle, Robert. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/169 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/169/001.2005.issue-169-en.xml IMF e-Library