Deposit Insurance Regulatory forbearance and Economic Growth : Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis /
An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation demonstrates how deposit insurance and prudential regulatory forbearance lead to banking crises and growth declines. The model assumptions are based on features of the Japanese financial system and regulation. The model demonstrates how bankin...
| Main Author: | Kletzer, Kenneth |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Dekle, Robert |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2005.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2005/169 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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