01657cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003376 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451860337 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Danninger, Stephan. Revenue Forecasts as Performance Targets / Stephan Danninger. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (20 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Budget revenue forecasts should be best estimates of expected receipts. Often they are not. This paper analyzes the rationale for overstated revenue forecasts and derives conditions for intentional biases. A theoretical model demonstrates that overstated revenue forecasts can be the result of the government's attempt to boost unobserved revenue collection effort. If positive forecast errors are costly and undermine public credibility of budget expenditure plans, the reverse outcome is possible and governments may understate revenue forecasts. A case study for Azerbaijan is presented in support of the former incentive motive. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/014 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/014/001.2005.issue-014-en.xml IMF e-Library