01737cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003435 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451860627 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Chakraborty, Shankha. Rent Seeking / Shankha Chakraborty, Era Dabla-Norris. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic performance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost of rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in it, since it enables them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, the level of rent seeking and economic performance are determined by the initial distribution of income and wealth. When individuals also differ in their productivity, not all wealthy agents become rent seekers and the social costs of rent seeking are typically lower. In both cases, multiple equilibria with different levels of rent seeking and production are possible. Mode of access: Internet Dabla-Norris, Era. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/043 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/043/001.2005.issue-043-en.xml IMF e-Library