01836cas a2200277 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003438 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451862201 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Espinosa-Vega, Marco. Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information / Marco Espinosa-Vega, Allen Berger, Nathan Miller, W. Scott Frame. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (41 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low-risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high-risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity. Mode of access: Internet Berger, Allen. Frame, W. Scott. Miller, Nathan. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/201 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/201/001.2005.issue-201-en.xml IMF e-Library