01720cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003479 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451860733 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Plekhanov, Alexander. How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? : Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence / Alexander Plekhanov, Raju Singh. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (33 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting. Mode of access: Internet Singh, Raju. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/054 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/054/001.2005.issue-054-en.xml IMF e-Library