01916cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003592 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451861266 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Cottarelli, Carlo. Efficiency and Legitimacy : Trade-Offs in IMF Governance / Carlo Cottarelli. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (32 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Designing appropriate governance structures for an international financial institution such as the IMF is difficult, because steps to enhance the legitimacy of such an institution through constraints on its decision-making process may affect its operational efficiency. Potential trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency exist for any public institution but are arguably more severe for an international one, because delegating power to it politically controversial and, thus, likely to imply tighter constraints. The paper also underscores that the trade-offs are not absolute, however: they depend on the specific ways in which legitimacy is pursued-that is, on the specific constraints that are set. Strategic reforms should, thus, aim at improving the terms of the trade-off by exploring steps that are Pareto-improving in the dimensions of legitimacy and efficiency. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/107 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/107/001.2005.issue-107-en.xml IMF e-Library