01898cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003682 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451861761 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Romeu, Rafael. Bidder Participation and Information in Currency Auctions / Rafael Romeu, Lawrence Ausubel. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (46 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper studies the participation and performance of sophisticated versus unsophisticated auction participants in an environment with numerous bidders, uncertainty, and asymmetric information. We examine multi-unit, pay-as-bid, currency auctions conducted by the Central Bank of Venezuela. We find that sophisticated bidders outperform their less sophisticated rivals during periods of high volatility, apparently as a result of their superior informationgathering ability. The result is consistent across both quantity (sophisticated bidders win more market share) and price (sophisticated bidders pay lower premiums). The result is consistent with the view that a pay-as-bid auction format may be detrimental to participation by less-informed bidders. Mode of access: Internet Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de imf Ausubel, Lawrence. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/157 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/157/001.2005.issue-157-en.xml IMF e-Library