01887cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF003740 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451862027 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Tuladhar, Anita. Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks / Anita Tuladhar. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005. 1 online resource (27 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/183 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/183/001.2005.issue-183-en.xml IMF e-Library