01637cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF004006 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451865622 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Bolt, Wilko. On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting / Wilko Bolt, Alexander Tieman. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006. 1 online resource (16 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature. Mode of access: Internet WP imf Tieman, Alexander. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/302 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/302/001.2006.issue-302-en.xml IMF e-Library