01789cas a2200277 a 4500 AALejournalIMF004150 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451863888 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ivanova, Anna. Outcomes-Based Conditionality : Its Role and Optimal Design / Anna Ivanova. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006. 1 online resource (25 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized. Mode of access: Internet IMF Loan imf International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions imf WP imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/128 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/128/001.2006.issue-128-en.xml IMF e-Library