01795cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF004473 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451864823 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Le Borgne, Eric. Economic and Political Determinants of Tax Amnesties in the U.S. States / Eric Le Borgne. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006. 1 online resource (13 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper revisits earlier studies on the determinants of tax amnesties. The novel findings are (i) amnesties are more likely to be declared during fiscal stress periods, and (ii) political factors significantly affect the introduction and timing of amnesties. In particular, the paper empirically disentangles opposite theoretical effects to show that governors perceive amnesties as another revenue source (rather than a tax increase alternative). Finally, supporting evidence shows that by breaking horizontal equity, amnesties might be perceived as unfair: a significant correlation exists between governors who lost their reelection bids and the introduction of a tax amnesty during their election years. Mode of access: Internet United States imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/222 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/222/001.2006.issue-222-en.xml IMF e-Library