01720cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF004530 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451865165 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Crowe, Christopher. Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate / Christopher Crowe. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006. 1 online resource (41 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this. Mode of access: Internet South Africa imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/256 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/256/001.2006.issue-256-en.xml IMF e-Library