01799cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF004936 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451869224 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Orphanides, Athanasios. Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction / Athanasios Orphanides, Spencer Dale, Par Osterholm. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008. 1 online resource (31 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information. Mode of access: Internet Dale, Spencer. Osterholm, Par. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/060 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/060/001.2008.issue-060-en.xml IMF e-Library