01685cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF004967 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451869330 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Brosio, Giorgio. Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries : Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy / Giorgio Brosio, Ehtisham Ahmad. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008. 1 online resource (27 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective. Mode of access: Internet Ahmad, Ehtisham. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/071 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/071/001.2008.issue-071-en.xml IMF e-Library