02102cas a2200277 a 4500 AALejournalIMF005991 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451873245 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL De Palma, Andre. Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / Andre De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009. 1 online resource (23 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. Mode of access: Internet United States imf Leruth, Luc. Prunier, Guillaume. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/177 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2009/177/001.2009.issue-177-en.xml IMF e-Library