01648cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF006028 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451873405 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Valderrama, Laura. Institutional Inertia / Laura Valderrama. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009. 1 online resource (25 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/193 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2009/193/001.2009.issue-193-en.xml IMF e-Library