01952cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF006166 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451874129 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL International Monetary Fund. Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability : Evidence From Panel Data Regressions. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 31 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992 to 2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/267 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2009/267/001.2009.issue-267-en.xml IMF e-Library