01753cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF006395 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451982633 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Weber, Anke. Monetary Policy Committees, Learning and Communication / Anke Weber. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010. 1 online resource (41 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2010/085 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/085/001.2010.issue-085-en.xml IMF e-Library