01995cas a2200301 a 4500 AALejournalIMF006616 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781455201815 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ratnovski, Lev. The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding / Lev Ratnovski, Rocco Huang. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement traditional retail deposits. Existing literature mainly points to the "bright side" of wholesale funding: sophisticated financiers can monitor banks, disciplining bad but refinancing good ones. This paper models a "dark side" of wholesale funding. In an environment with a costless but noisy public signal on bank project quality, short-term wholesale financiers have lower incentives to conduct costly monitoring, and instead may withdraw based on negative public signals, triggering inefficient liquidations. Comparative statics suggest that such distortions of incentives are smaller when public signals are less relevant and project liquidation costs are higher, e.g., when banks hold mostly relationship-based small business loans. Mode of access: Internet Interest Rate imf Monetary Value imf Wholesale Financier imf WP imf Huang, Rocco. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2010/170 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/170/001.2010.issue-170-en.xml IMF e-Library