The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments /

This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and p...

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מידע ביבליוגרפי
מחבר ראשי: Quintyn, Marc
מחברים אחרים: Gollwitzer, Sophia
פורמט: כתב-עת
שפה:English
יצא לאור: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010.
סדרה:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2010/193
גישה מקוונת:Full text available on IMF
תיאור
סיכום:This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and political environment. The paper presents a composite indicator allowing for the identification of a country's position along this transition path. The findings suggest that (i) while the establishment of autonomous central banks seems to be relatively independent from the broader institutional framework, sound budgetary institutions tend to be established in countries with higher levels of rule of law for the elites, and (ii) while central bank independence is effective in reducing inflation irrespective of a country's position along the transition path, budget institutions seem to be most effective as a disciplining device in weak institutional environments.
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תיאור פיזי:1 online resource (59 pages)
פורמט:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
גישה:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students