01866cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF006728 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781455205424 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Mishra, Prachi. Protection for Free? : The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff suspensions / Prachi Mishra, Rodney D. Ludema, Anna Maria Mayda. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010. 1 online resource (48 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions. Mode of access: Internet Ludema, Rodney D. Mayda, Anna Maria. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2010/211 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/211/001.2010.issue-211-en.xml IMF e-Library