01723cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007084 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781455221004 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Restrepo, Jorge. Fiscal Rules in a Volatile World : A Welfare-Based Approach / Jorge Restrepo, Carlos Garcia, Evan Tanner. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2011. 1 online resource (42 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students It is widely agreed that a fiscal rule should boost discipline and credibility, reduce macroeconomic volatility, and be easily understood. To support such goals, a government may run structural surpluses and accumulate a precautionary cushion of assets on behalf of agents who do not enjoy access to capital markets. As an additional criterion, that level of assets should be bounded. We provide an example of a structural surplus rule that satisfies all such criteria. In our general equilibrium simulations, we show that such a rule benefits credit-constrained consumers but may hurt others. Mode of access: Internet Garcia, Carlos. Tanner, Evan. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2011/056 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/056/001.2011.issue-056-en.xml IMF e-Library