01698cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007097 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781455228072 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Piazza, Roberto. Leadership Contestability, Monopolistic Rents and Growth / Roberto Piazza. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2011. 1 online resource (21 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students I construct an endogenous growth model where R and D is carried out at the industry level in a game of innovation between leaders and followers. Innovation costs for followers are assumed to increase with the technological lag from leaders. We obtain three results that contrast with standard Schumpeterian models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992). First, leaders may innovate in equilibrium, in an attempt to force followers out of the innovation game. Second, policies (such as patents) that allow for strong protections of monopolies can reduce the steady state growth rate of the economy. Third, multiple equilibria arise when monopolies' protection is large. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2011/063 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/063/001.2011.issue-063-en.xml IMF e-Library