01688cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007435 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451930115 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Enoch, Charles. Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank Safety Net Operations / Charles Enoch. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students To mitigate the risks of contagion from problems arising in the banking sector, many countries operate some form of banking sector safety net. Such safety nets generally involve a judicious mixture of transparency and ambiguity. This ambiguity may be important to counter moral hazard effects but may lead to excessive forbearance in the face of banking problems. While the scope for ambiguity has been declining, some ambiguity in the handling of individual institutions remains. In any case, ex post transparency is essential for reviewing the propriety of any assistance and preserving the authorities' future reputation and policy credibility. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/138 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/138/001.1997.issue-138-en.xml IMF e-Library