01705cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007458 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451977318 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Keen, Michael. Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism / Michael Keen. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997. 1 online resource (35 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Vertical tax externalities between levels of government can occur in federal structures, with responses to the tax policies of one level of government affecting the tax base of the other. Such effects mostly arise when federal and state governments co-occupy the same tax base. This paper examines these externalities by considering their implications for a range of issues in fiscal federalism: the relationship between state and federal tax rates, the equilibrium levels of these taxes, the relevance of experience in federal countries for policy design in international settings, intergovernmental grants, and the assignment of tax powers among levels of government. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/173 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/173/001.1997.issue-173-en.xml IMF e-Library