01721cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007516 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451854145 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Garibaldi, Pietro. Search Unemployment with Advance Notice / Pietro Garibaldi. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1998. 1 online resource (42 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper proposes and solves a search model in which job separation requires mandatory notice. When jobs are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty, firms would issue advance notice even with good business conditions. We show that such precautionary policy is not pursued if it entails sufficiently high productivity losses. If workers can search on the job, an increase in advance notice increases job to job movements, reduces unemployment flows, and has ambiguous effects on unemployment. Results are consistent with the fact that North American and European labor markets, despite their differences in job security provisions, experience similar turnover rates and dissimilar unemployment flows. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1998/119 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1998/119/001.1998.issue-119-en.xml IMF e-Library