01735cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007642 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451854961 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Dabla-Norris, Era. The Enforcement of Property Rights and Underdevelopment / Era Dabla-Norris, Scott Freeman. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (22 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper formalizes the role of legal infrastructure in economic development in a general equilibrium model with endogenously determined property rights enforcement. It illustrates the mutual importance of property rights protection and market production by the model's multiplicity of equilibria. In one equilibrium, property rights are enforced and market activity is unhampered. In the other, property rights are not enforced, which discourages economic activity and leaves the economy without the resources and incentives to enforce property rights. Even identically endowed economies may therefore find themselves in very different equilibria. Mode of access: Internet Freeman, Scott. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/127 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/127/001.1999.issue-127-en.xml IMF e-Library