01572cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007658 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451858082 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Gupta, Poonam. Why Do Firms Pay Antidumping Duty? / Poonam Gupta. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999. 1 online resource (24 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students With the virtual elimination of tariffs and quotas under GATT, antidumping measures emerged as a key instrument of protection. Under antidumping actions exporters can either raise the price to eliminate the dumping margin or pay an antidumping duty. This paper analyzes the incentives to exporters to choose between duty or settlement outcomes and finds that due to the smaller loss in market share exporters may prefer an antidumping duty over voluntary settlement. The paper analyzes the welfare implications of these outcomes and finds that they are ambiguous. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/166 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/166/001.1999.issue-166-en.xml IMF e-Library