01853cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007667 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451842999 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Norregaard, John. Taxes and Tradable Permits As Instruments for Controlling Pollution : Theory and Practice / John Norregaard, Valerie Reppelin. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (49 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the relative merits of two dominant economic instruments for reducing pollution-'green' taxes and tradable permits. Theoretically, the two instruments share many similarities, and on balance, neither seems preferable to the other. In practice, however, most countries have relied more on taxes than on permits to control pollution. The analysis suggests a number of lessons to be learned from country experiences regarding the design and implementation of both instruments. While many, particularly European countries, currently have long-term programs involving environmental taxes, a willingness to experiment with tradable permits seems to be growing, especially given the Kyoto protocol emission targets. Mode of access: Internet Reppelin, Valerie. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/013 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/013/001.2000.issue-013-en.xml IMF e-Library