01786cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007695 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451847109 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Leruth, Luc. The Complier Pays Principle : The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management / Luc Leruth, R. Paris, I. Ruzicka. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax policy can actually undermine it. The paper uses the arguments at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. The paper also proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs. Mode of access: Internet Paris, R. Ruzicka, I. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/051 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/051/001.2000.issue-051-en.xml IMF e-Library