01677cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007697 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451847376 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Swagel, Phillip. Unionization and Strategic Trade Policy / Phillip Swagel, Ling Tan. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (17 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the effect of unionization on welfare and trade policy in a model of duopolists competing in a third market. It shows that the traditional result that the presence of a union necessitates a stronger strategic trade policy to reach the optimal level of welfare depends on the mode of competition. With Bertrand duopolists, a union can be welfare-improving; it can also lead to a weaker trade policy, or even reverse the direction of the optimal policy. The results highlight the importance for trade policy of understanding the nature of firm behavior and the institutional features of the labor market. Mode of access: Internet Tan, Ling. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/053 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/053/001.2000.issue-053-en.xml IMF e-Library