01842cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007718 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451851649 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Karacadag, Cem. The New Capital Adequacy Framework : Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures / Cem Karacadag, Michael Taylor. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (40 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on bank capital standards. When compared with the existing Capital Accord, the proposals represent a shift across two intersecting dimensions-regulatory versus economic capital, and rules-based versus process-oriented regulation. On minimum capital standards, the case for using external ratings may be stronger than has been recognized, given the divergences in the purpose and design of internal ratings. On supervisory review, ensuring comparability among supervisors and building supervisory capacity will present serious challenges. On enhancing market discipline, incentives for markets to exercise discipline will be required. Mode of access: Internet Taylor, Michael. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/093 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/093/001.2000.issue-093-en.xml IMF e-Library