Contacts, Credibility and Common Knowledge : Their Influenceon Inflation Convergence.
This paper explains why sovereign issuers of reserve currencies do not use unexpected inflation to repudiate their foreign liabilities. Monetary restraint is exercised because of the fear that reserve users will switch to other currencies if an attempt is made to raise 'excessive' revenue....
| Corporate Author: | International Monetary Fund |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1989.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1989/027 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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