01732cas a2200253 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007807 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451856958 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Fullenkamp, Connel. Should Subsidized Private Transfers Replace Government Social Insurance? / Connel Fullenkamp, Ralph Chami. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (26 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Private transfers between individuals or through organized charities are increasingly viewed as an alternative for government social insurance programs. This paper models the incentive effects of government subsidized private transfers and finds that while there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost to this policy. It is shown analytically, as well as through simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers is positive for a wide range of parameter values. This result indicates that subsidized private transfers in net terms are welfare enhancing. Mode of access: Internet Chami, Ralph. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/150 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/150/001.2000.issue-150-en.xml IMF e-Library