01701cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007822 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451858686 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Olters, Jan-Peter. Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government / Jan-Peter Olters. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (22 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the 'economic model of politics' proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions. With it, a country's overall budget can be derived endogenously, electoral fluctuations explained on the basis of changes to the individuals' income and wealth, and political behavior described in terms of the individuals' decisions regarding votes, abstentions, and party membership. The model suggests that a country's wealth distribution is a crucial variable affecting its economic stability and the government's size relative to output. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/174 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/174/001.2000.issue-174-en.xml IMF e-Library