01769cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007854 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451841824 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Santaella, Julio. Stabilization Programs and External Enforcement : Experience From the 1920's / Julio Santaella. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1993. 1 online resource (48 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Credibility and financing problems are important reasons why countries may seek to involve external institutions in the design and implementation of stabilization programs. In particular, governments may rely on external institutions to 'enforce' programs that would otherwise lack credibility. This paper analyzes six European currency stabilizations sponsored by the League of Nations in the 1920s. It emphasizes the means by which the League provided a 'commitment technology' and enforced compliance, thereby helping to ensure successful stabilizations. Empirical evidence indicates that countries with greater credibility problems relied more heavily on external enforcement to stabilize their currencies. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1993/003 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1993/003/001.1993.issue-003-en.xml IMF e-Library