01889cas a2200313 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007875 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451859607 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Xie, Danyang. To "B" or Not to "B" : A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model / Danyang Xie. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000. 1 online resource (18 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R and D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should monopolies protected by intellectual property rights be broken up? The answer is 'no' in a Romer-type growth model, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be 'yes' in a model advocated by Jones (1995). Mode of access: Internet Competition Policy imf Growth imf Production Function imf R and D imf WP imf United States imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/189 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/189/001.2000.issue-189-en.xml IMF e-Library