01609cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF007901 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451848793 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Gershenson, Dmitry. Sanctions and Civil Conflict / Dmitry Gershenson. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (37 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/066 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/066/001.2001.issue-066-en.xml IMF e-Library