Sovereign Debt Relief Schemes and Welfare /

This paper shows that concerted debt reduction may be welfare-improving even when the investment disincentive effect of a debt overhang is not large enough to place the debtor country on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve. Whether the appropriate relief scheme involves debt reduction or new mon...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Husain, Aasim
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1992.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1992/025
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
Description
Summary:This paper shows that concerted debt reduction may be welfare-improving even when the investment disincentive effect of a debt overhang is not large enough to place the debtor country on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve. Whether the appropriate relief scheme involves debt reduction or new money, however, depends on whether investment disincentives or liquidity constraints dominate. It is shown that, except under very special circumstances, mixed policy packages involving both debt and liquidity relief may not yield the desired results.
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Physical Description:1 online resource (20 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Access:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students