01497cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF008049 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451874501 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Chan-Lau, Jorge. The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt / Jorge Chan-Lau. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. 1 online resource (12 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/204 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/204/001.2001.issue-204-en.xml IMF e-Library