The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt /
This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces...
| Main Author: | Chan-Lau, Jorge |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/204 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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