01604cas a2200289 a 4500 AALejournalIMF008147 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451850376 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Ley, Eduardo. Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game / Eduardo Ley. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. 1 online resource (13 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood). Mode of access: Internet Bayesian Analysis imf Contract Curve imf Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue imf WP imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/081 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/081/001.2002.issue-081-en.xml IMF e-Library