Sovereign Bond Restructuring : Collective Action Clauses and official Crisis Intervention /
This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic beha...
| Main Author: | Kletzer, Kenneth |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2003.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2003/134 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
Similar Items
-
Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? /
by: Becker, Torbjorn
Published: (2001) -
Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts : Encouraging Greater Use.
Published: (2002) -
Private Bond Restructurings : Lessons for the Case of Sovereign Debtors /
by: Pinon-Farah, Marco
Published: (1996) -
Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Growth /
by: Forni, Lorenzo
Published: (2016) -
The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt : Assessing the Benefits, Risks, and Feasibility of Aggregating Claims.
Published: (2003)