01839cas a2200265 a 4500 AALejournalIMF008480 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451858594 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Fredriksson, Per. The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures : Theory and Evidence / Per Fredriksson, Muthukumara Mani, Richard Damania. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003. 1 online resource (33 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to resist legal reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency and eliminate corruption. The analysis predicts that in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance are weak. In such countries, corruption is more pervasive and the compliance with regulations is low. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. Mode of access: Internet Damania, Richard. Mani, Muthukumara. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2003/172 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/172/001.2003.issue-172-en.xml IMF e-Library