01710cas a2200241 a 4500 AALejournalIMF008508 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451859737 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Boughton, James. Who's in Charge? : Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs / James Boughton. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003. 1 online resource (25 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower. Mode of access: Internet IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2003/191 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/191/001.2003.issue-191-en.xml IMF e-Library