02064cas a2200325 a 4500 AALejournalIMF008575 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451845723 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Mayer, Wolfgang. The Political Economy of Conditional and Unconditional Foreign Assistance : Grants vs. Loan Rollovers / Wolfgang Mayer, Alex Mourmouras. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. 1 online resource (28 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students Improving the effectiveness of financial assistance programs is a priority of international financial institutions (IFIs). This paper examines the effectiveness of alternative assistance instruments in a dynamic political economy framework. Economic policies of the receiving country are distorted by the influence of a domestic interest group. The assistance-providing IFI aims at reducing these distortions. The IFI provides assistance either as grants or loans, and either conditionally on reducing policy distortions or unconditionally. The paper shows that, other things constant, one-time grants are more effective than loan rollovers when assistance is unconditional, but that the opposite is true when assistance is conditional. Mode of access: Internet Conditionality imf Developing Country imf IMF imf Present Value imf WP imf United States imf Mourmouras, Alex. IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/038 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/038/001.2004.issue-038-en.xml IMF e-Library